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WHAT DO 1.5 MILLION WAL-MART WOMEN 
HAVE IN COMMON?: DUKES V. WAL-MART 
CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION 
Abstract: On April 26, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, held that Rule 23 commonality 
and typicality existed among 1.5 million female employees of Wal-Mart 
claiming gender discrimination in the company’s hiring and promotion 
practices. This Comment addresses the commonality prong and argues 
that courts should be reluctant to certify a class of plaintiffs in employ-
ment cases when a company’s hiring practices are as subjective and local-
ized as Wal-Mart’s. 
Introduction 
 On June 8, 2001, Betty Dukes, an African-American Wal-Mart em-
ployee from California, along with five other named plaintiffs and a 
class of similarly situated female Wal-Mart employees, filed a sexual dis-
crimination case against their employer.1 They alleged that women 
employed by Wal-Mart were paid less than men in comparable positions 
and received less frequent promotions to in-store management posi-
tions than their male colleagues, in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.2 The class included in the complaint encompassed 
all women employed at any Wal-Mart store “who have been or may be 
subjected to Wal-Mart’s challenged pay and management track promo-
tions policies and practices.”3 The plaintiffs, a class of approximately 
1.5 million women, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, back pay, 
and punitive damages, but not traditional compensatory damages.4 
                                                                                                                     
 Wal-Mart argued that class certification was inappropriate because, 
among other reasons, the class of women failed to meet the commonal-
ity requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
 
1 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Dukes II ), 603 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2010); Plaintiffs’ 
Third Amended Complaint at 3, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2001 WL 1902806 (N.D. 
Cal. 2001) (No. C01-2252 MJJ). 
2 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 577; Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Dukes I ), 222 F.R.D. 137, 141 
(N.D. Cal. 2004); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
3 Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 141–42. 
4 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 578. 
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dure.5 In 2004, a federal district court in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
(Dukes I ) certified the plaintiffs as a class.6 In 2010, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in a 
sharply divided 6–5 en banc decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
(Dukes II ).7 On December 6, 2010 the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to answer two questions: (1) whether and under what circum-
stances claims for monetary relief can be certified under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), which is limited to injunctive and declara-
tory relief; and (2) whether the class certification ordered under Rule 
23(b)(2) was consistent with Rule 23(a).8 
 Part I of this Comment briefly reviews the commonality require-
ment for class action certification as discussed by the Ninth Circuit in 
Dukes II and the evidence the plaintiffs presented to satisfy this re-
quirement.9 Part II examines and discusses the plaintiffs’ theory of 
commonality based principally on decentralized and subjective decision 
making.10 Finally, Part III questions whether the plaintiffs’ theory was 
sufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).11 
I. Rule 23(a)(2) Commonality Through Subjectivity and 
Decentralization 
 Plaintiffs seeking to certify a class have the burden of proving that 
all four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the require-
ments of Rule 23(b) have been met.12 Rule 23(a) authorizes class ac-
tion certification only when: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder is 
impractical; (2) there are common questions of law or fact; (3) the 
                                                                                                                      
5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 578–79; Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 150. Wal-Mart 
also opposed class certification because (1) the number of women in the class alone makes 
the case unmanageable, (2) pay and promotion decisions made locally by store managers 
necessarily defeat a finding of commonality, and (3) inclusion of a claim for punitive dam-
ages renders the case unsuitable for certification under Rule 23(b)(2). Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 
579; Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 150, 170. 
6 Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 188. 
7 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 577. 
8 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277). Under 
23(b)(2), a class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and “the party oppos-
ing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that 
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the 
class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 
9 See infra notes 12–52 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 53–69 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 70–86 and accompanying text. 
12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Dukes I ), 222 F.R.D. 137, 143 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004) 
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claims of the representatives are typical of the class; and (4) the repre-
sentatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.13 
The class must also meet one of the three types of class actions under 
Rule 23(b).14 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Wal-Mart argued that the 
class in Dukes did not meet the commonality and typicality require-
ments of Rule 23(a)(2) and 23(a)(3).15 
                                                                                                                     
 Commonality requires a common issue of law or fact.16 Typicality 
ensures that the class representative possesses the same interests and 
suffered the same injury as all class members.17 Rule 23’s commonality 
and typicality requirements are closely related, and their analyses tend 
to merge.18 As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, both commonal-
ity and typicality serve as guides by which to determine whether a class 
action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claims and the 
class claims are so interrelated that the interests of all class members 
will be fairly represented and protected.19 
 After reviewing Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, the 
Dukes II court clarified the standard to determine whether to grant class 
certification.20 The court looked to the 1982 decision General Telephone 
Co. v. Falcon, the only U.S. Supreme Court case addressing Rule 23(a) 
in the context of Title VII discrimination and directly on point in Dukes 
II.21 The Ninth Circuit explained that, under Falcon, district courts must 
perform rigorous analysis to ensure that the prerequisites of Rule 23 
have been satisfied and that the analysis will often require looking be-
yond the pleadings to issues overlapping with the merits of underlying 
claims.22 Falcon requires district courts to ensure that Rule 23’s re-
quirements are actually met rather than presumed from the plead-
 
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
14 Id. 23(b). 
15 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Dukes II ), 603 F.3d 571, 578–79 (9th Cir. 2010). An-
other question raised by Wal-Mart’s appeal was under what circumstances a claim for mon-
etary relief can be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). Id. at 579. Rule 23(b)(2) is not appropri-
ate in cases where monetary relief predominates over injunctive or declaratory relief. 
Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 618. Wal-Mart argued that the plaintiffs’ request for back pay—claims 
for monetary relief—predominated. Id. The court reasoned, however, that back pay is 
equitable relief under Title VII and therefore a “make-whole remedy in employment class 
actions notwithstanding its monetary nature.” Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 170. 
16 Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 144; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 
17 Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 144–45; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 
18 Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). 
19 Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 
20 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 580–98. 
21 Id. at 633; see Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155–61. 
22 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 594; see Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160. 
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ings.23 The district court may only consider merit issues related to the 
class certification requirements.24 At the class certification stage, plain-
tiffs must present a theory regarding common questions of law or fact 
to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), but the court 
should not consider whether the plaintiffs’ theory will ultimately suc-
ceed on the merits.25 When reviewing the decision to certify a class, the 
appeals court then must defer to the district court’s factual findings 
regarding the applicability of Rule 23 criteria.26 
 In Falcon, the Supreme Court stated that there is a wide gap be-
tween an individual’s claim that he or she has been denied a promotion 
on discriminatory grounds and the existence of a class of people that 
have suffered the same injury giving rise to common questions of law 
or fact.27 To bridge that gap, plaintiffs must provide evidence to sup-
port an inference that (1) discriminatory treatment is typical of the de-
fendant’s promotion practices, (2) the practices are motivated by a pol-
icy of discrimination that pervades the company, or (3) the policy of 
discrimination is reflected in other employment practices.28 
 In light of the Falcon standard, the Ninth Circuit determined that 
the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) was met in Dukes II.29 
The court ruled that the plaintiffs’ evidence tended to show a common 
question of fact: “Does Wal-Mart’s policy of decentralized, subjective 
employment decision making operate to discriminate against female 
employees?”30 To establish this common question of fact, the plaintiffs 
presented sociological, statistical, and anecdotal evidence of company 
policies and practices.31 
 First, based on expert testimony from sociologist Dr. William Biel-
by, the court determined that control and culture were sufficiently cen-
tralized to support the plaintiffs’ theory that Wal-Mart’s pattern or 
                                                                                                                      
23 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 582; see Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160. 
24 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 594. 
25 Id. at 587; see United Steel Workers v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 808–09 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
26 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 579. 
27 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157. 
28 Id. at 158. 
29 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 600. 
30 Id. at 603. 
31 Id. at 600. Wal-Mart unsuccessfully tried to exclude Dr. Bielby’s testimony under the 
Daubert test. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993); Dukes II, 
603 F.3d at 602. The Ninth Circuit noted that at the class certification stage, it is enough 
that the expert presents scientifically reliable evidence that tends to show a common ques-
tion of fact. Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 603. 
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practice of discrimination affects all class members in the same way.32 
Dr. Bielby presented factual evidence of Wal-Mart’s company-wide poli-
cies and practices, including its uniform personnel and management 
structure, centralized corporate culture, and consistent gender-related 
disparities in every region.33 Wal-Mart’s corporate culture is constantly 
reinforced through a national orientation program, daily meetings, a 
Wal-Mart cheer, and centralized communication, including “Wal-Mart 
TV.”34 The testimony also supported a culture of gender stereotyping.35 
 Second, Dr. Bielby’s testimony supported the commonality deter-
mination even though Wal-Mart’s pay and promotion decisions rely on 
subjective factors and local managerial discretion.36 According to Dr. 
Bielby’s research, personnel decisions are particularly susceptible to 
gender biases when based on subjective factors because decisionmaker 
discretion provides an opportunity for people to seek out stereotype-
conforming information and minimize non-conforming information.37 
For example, Wal-Mart pays its hourly employees according to the same 
general pay structure; local store managers, however, are allowed to 
depart from the minimum rates, within a two-dollar per hour range, 
with limited oversight and no need to cite objective criteria for the dif-
ferences.38 With the average Wal-Mart employee earning $18,000 a 
year, two dollars per hour makes a significant difference in pay.39 
                                                                                                                     
 Third, a statistics expert, Dr. Richard Drogin, presented statistical 
evidence of class-wide gender disparities that he found attributable to 
discrimination.40 
 
32 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 612; see Gary M. Kramer, No Class: Post-1991 Barriers to Rule 23 
Certification of Across-the-Board Employment Discrimination Cases, 15 Lab. Law. 415, 437 (2000) 
(noting that decentralized decision making normally defeats class action commonality). 
33 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 612. 
34 Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 151–52. Wal-Mart is so centralized that the home office con-
trols the temperature and music in each store throughout the country. Id. The Wal-Mart 
cheer is particularly enthusiastic: “Give me a W! Give me an A! Give me an L! Give me a 
squiggly! Give me an M! Give me an A! Give me an R! Give me a T! What’s that spell? 
Walmart! Whose Walmart is it? It’s my Walmart! Who’s number one? The customer! Al-
ways!” Walmart Cheer, Walmartstores.com, http://walmartstores.com/AboutUs/320.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
35 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 600–01. 
36 Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 146–47. 
37 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 601. 
38 Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 146–47. One store manager explains: “There’s [a presumptive 
limit of two dollars above the base], but I can do what I want. I mean, if I start throwing 
money around, I mean, eventually the phone is going to ring. But the store manager has 
the flexibility to do what he needs to do to run the building.” Id. at 147. 
39 Id. at 147. 
40 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 603–04. 
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 Finally, the plaintiffs used circumstantial and anecdotal evidence 
from class members throughout the country of discriminatory attitudes 
held or tolerated by management.41 Betty Dukes, for example, often 
expressed interest in becoming a manager but never had the opportu-
nity to train for a management position.42 Instead, Ms. Dukes was de-
moted and punished more harshly than her male co-workers for per-
formance issues.43 When Ms. Dukes became eligible for promotion 
again a year after her demotion, at least four managerial positions were 
filled by men.44 These positions were never posted or otherwise an-
ou
 the hypothesis 
pecially when coupled with Wal-Mart’s centralized 
corporate culture.52 
                                                                                                                     
n nced.45 
 Plaintiffs also presented anecdotal evidence of managers harbor-
ing gender bias.46 In one case, a male store manager told an employee, 
“Men are here to make a career and women aren’t. Retail is for house-
wives who just need to earn extra money.”47 Another male support 
manager stated: “We need you in toys . . . you’re a girl, why do you want 
to be in hardware?”48 A female store manager gave a sporting goods 
position to a male employee because she “needed a man in the job.”49 
The court found that this anecdotal evidence supported
that Wal-Mart’s culture includes gender stereotyping.50 
 Although none of these factors alone would support a finding of 
commonality, the district court found that all of the evidence taken to-
gether raised an inference that Wal-Mart’s system of decentralized, sub-
jective employment decision making operated to discriminate against 
female employees in compensation and promotion.51 The court found 
that this subjective system of decision making affects all plaintiffs in a 
common manner, es
 
41 Id. at 600. 
42 Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 10. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 166. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 600; Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 166. 
51 See Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 600; Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 166; see also Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988). 
52 Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 166. 
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II. Commonality Without a Specific Discriminatory Policy 
 In order to meet the commonality and typicality requirements of 
Rule 23(a)(2), plaintiffs usually identify and challenge a specific em-
ployment practice.53 In Dukes, however, the plaintiffs argued that Wal-
Mart’s diffuse structure and subjective in-store pay and promotion deci-
sions, made at the discretion of local store or district level managers, 
are discriminatory.54 They argued that Wal-Mart’s decentralized struc-
ture and subjective decision making allowed gender bias to seep into 
the system.55 The court acknowledged “the absence of a specific dis-
criminatory policy promulgated by Wal-Mart” yet accepted the argu-
ment that the case presents a common question of fact.56 
 Wal-Mart argued that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden be-
cause discretionary decision making alone is insufficient to establish 
commonality.57 Managers’ discretionary authority, the company ar-
gued, does not support a finding of commonality because 
“[d]ecentralized, discretionary decisionmaking is not inherently dis-
criminatory.”58 The district court acknowledged that managerial discre-
tion and excessive subjectivity alone may not create a common ques-
tion, but where it is part of a consistent corporate policy and supported 
by other evidence giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it can 
support a finding of commonality.59 
                                                                                                                     
 The Ninth Circuit cited Shipes v. Trinity Industries, a 1993 decision 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for the proposition 
that entirely subjective personnel processes that operate to discriminate 
can satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23.60 
Forest Shipes, a black employee who was laid off, claimed that his em-
ployer’s all white supervisory force discriminated against him and other 
similarly situated employees in employment decisions.61 Trinity, a rail-
road and steel company, argued that Shipes should not be in the same 
class as blacks employed at different plants because that class would fail 
 
53 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). 
54 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Dukes II ), 603 F.3d 571, 601 (9th Cir. 2010); Dukes v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Dukes I ), 222 F.R.D. 137, 152 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
55 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 601; Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 152. 
56 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 603. 
57 Id. at 612. 
58 Id. 
59 Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 148–50. 
60 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 612; see Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 
1993). 
61 Shipes, 987 F.3d at 315. 
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to satisfy the commonality requirement.62 The Fifth Circuit held that 
because the two plants used the same subjective criteria in making per-
sonnel decisions and have other centralized employee programs, such 
as retirement plans and a common employee handbook, the common-
ality and typicality requirements were met.63 
 The Dukes II court also found support for class action certification 
in a footnote in the 1982 U.S. Supreme Court decision General Telephone 
Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, which reads: “Significant proof that an em-
ployer operated under a general policy of discrimination conceivably 
could justify a class of both applicants and employees if the discrimina-
tion manifested itself in hiring and promotion practices in the same 
general fashion, such as through entirely subjective decision-making 
processes.”64 Wal-Mart and the dissenting judges contended that the 
plaintiffs did not provide “significant proof” that the alleged discrimina-
tory injury affected employees throughout the country because their 
expert testimony failed to indicate a general policy of discrimination.65 
The Ninth Circuit majority stated in response that any “significant 
proof” requirement was “hypothetical,” a demonstrative example, and 
“in clear dicta.”66 
 The courts disagree as to exactly what level of commonality is re-
quired to satisfy Rule 23 and the significance of the Falcon footnote.67 
Courts are split in particular over whether a policy of subjective deci-
sion making can satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a).68 
Inconsistencies in the application of Rule 23 will continue in light of 
the lack of Supreme Court guidance, fact-specific application of the 
commonality requirement, and trial court discretion.69 
                                                                                                                      
62 Id. at 315–16. 
63 Id. at 316. The district court found that, in addition to using the same subjective cri-
teria in making personnel decisions: white supervisors at both plants applied the subjective 
criteria; employees were transferred between the plants; the plants had the same insurance 
plan, retirement program, and administrative forms; and the two plants used the same 
hourly employee handbook. Id. 
64 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.15 (1982). 
65 Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 594–95, 633–34. 
66 Id. at 595 & n.15; see Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160 n.15. In response, the dissent in Dukes II 
noted, “We are bound by the Supreme Court’s instructions whether they are stated in the 
first sentence of an opinion or in the final footnote.” Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 633 (Ikuta, J., 
dissenting). 
67 Kramer, supra note 32, at 430–31. 
68 See Daniel S. Klein, Bridging the Falcon Gap: Do Claims of Subjective Decisionmaking in 
Employment Discrimination Class Actions Satisfy the Rule 23(a) Commonality and Typicality Re-
quirements?, 25 Rev. Litig. 131, 133 (2006). 
69 See id. 
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III. Decentralized and Subjective Decision Making to Establish 
Commonality 
 By allowing the certification of a class of 1.5 million female Wal-
Mart employees in Dukes II, the Ninth Circuit created an unmanageable 
class and undermined the efficiency and fairness goals of Rule 23’s 
commonality requirement.70 Class action can be a useful procedural 
tool to address broad-based grievances fairly and efficiently.71 The 
commonality requirement ensures that the class action is economical 
and that the claims are so interrelated that the interests of all class 
members will be fairly and adequately protected in a single lawsuit.72 
Although granting class certification to the plaintiffs in Dukes may ap-
pear to serve both the class action device’s fairness and efficiency goals 
and Title VII’s antidiscrimination objectives, the class is likely to prove 
unmanageable and, if followed in other circuits, unfair to defendants.73 
 The Ninth Circuit should not have certified the class based entirely 
on Wal-Mart’s subjective decision making absent evidence of a specific 
discriminatory policy promulgated by the employer.74 Although the 
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that subjective decision making alone does 
not warrant class certification, the court relied heavily and almost ex-
clusively on the plaintiffs’ subjective and decentralized decision-making 
theory to rule that the commonality requirement was satisfied and to 
certify the class.75 In addition, even though the plaintiffs emphasized 
that the subjective decision-making theory was supported by other evi-
dence giving rise to an inference of discrimination (such as statistical 
evidence of gender inequality), this evidence should not supplant evi-
dence of a specific discriminatory practice.76 
 Wal-Mart, like most employers, must be able to use subjective 
judgments in employment decisions because they are useful and pro-
mote legitimate business goals.77 Although social science research may 
indicate that subjectivity can lead to discriminatory decision making, 
class action plaintiffs should be required to show more than statistical 
                                                                                                                      
70 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971); Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. (Dukes II ), 603 F.3d 571, 603, 628 (9th Cir. 2010); Klein, supra note 68, at 137. 
71 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982). 
72 Id. at 157 n.13. 
73 See infra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
74 See Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 628. 
75 See id. at 612. 
76 Id.; Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Dukes I ), 222 F.R.D. 137, 149–50 (N.D. Cal. 
2004). 
77 See Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 149. 
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evidence of gender disparities.78 A class action would be appropriate, 
for example, even for a class as large as 1.5 million people, if Wal-Mart 
had a nationwide policy of paying women ten percent less than men in 
the same positions or another uniform policy that affected all plaintiffs 
in a similar manner.79 
 Furthermore, Wal-Mart cannot raise a compelling defense to an 
amorphous claim of discrimination based on subjective decision mak-
ing.80 Because the plaintiffs did not claim that Wal-Mart took affirma-
tive steps to discriminate, affecting all class members in a similar way, it 
is hard to imagine how Wal-Mart would be able to raise a defense to the 
plaintiffs’ nebulous claim of discrimination through subjective decision 
making and lack of sufficient authority over individual managers’ dis-
cretionary employment and promotion decisions.81 
 The Ninth Circuit described the plaintiffs’ burden to establish 
commonality as “permissive and minimal,” but the 1982 U.S. Supreme 
Court decision General Telephone Co. v. Falcon suggests a more rigorous 
analysis to determine that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been 
met, including “significant proof” to support a claim of discrimination 
through subjective decision making.82 By lowering the standards (or 
adopting “permissive standards”) for class action certification, the court 
appeared comfortable placing the onus on the jury to decide whether 
it accepts the plaintiffs’ theory of commonality and expert testimony.83 
Class action lawsuits, however, are expensive to litigate, and most de-
fendants will settle as soon as the class is certified rather than take the 
case to trial and risk an expensive judgment.84 As then-Judge So-
tomayor acknowledged when she sat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, class action certification provides plaintiffs with 
powerful leverage during settlement negotiations, and the sheer size of 
the class can enhance this effect.85 Because courts do not consider mer-
                                                                                                                      
78 See Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 603. Plaintiffs’ burden of establishing an employment dis-
crimination case goes beyond showing there are statistical disparities in the workforce. See 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). 
79 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
80 See Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 149. 
81 See Reeb v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 651 (6th Cir. 2006). 
82 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160 n.15, 161; see Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 600. 
83 See Dukes II, 603 F.3d at 600. 
84 Brief for Equal Employment Advisory Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner at 17, Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Butler, 520 U.S. 1103 (1997) (No. 96-943). 
85 In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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its issues at the class certification stage, cases such as Dukes may settle 
before the merits of the claims are even decided.86 
Conclusion 
 In Dukes II, the Ninth Circuit held that the commonality require-
ment of Rule 23 can be met absent evidence of a specific discrimina-
tory policy or practice. The court determined that evidence of a uni-
form corporate culture, coupled with decentralized and subjective 
decision making, establishes a common question of law. The court’s 
reading of the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) could po-
tentially broaden the scope of potential employment discrimination 
class action litigation. In order to meet the commonality requirement 
of Rule 23(a)(2), plaintiffs should be required to identify a specific as-
pect of corporate culture or decision making that is discriminatory. 
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